

TOP SECRET

NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS

22 July 1959

25X1

CONTINUED CONTROL

Copy No. C **63**

DOS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

25X1



DOCUMENT NO. 19
NO CHANGE IN CLASS
() DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010 25X1
AUTH: HR 70
DATE 4.14.80 REVIEWER:

25X1

State Dept. review completed

TOP SECRET

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

22 July 1959

DAILY BRIEF

25X1

i

II. ASIA-AFRICA

OK
25X1
Afghanistan-USSR: Afghanistan and the USSR on 18 July announced a new agreement under which Soviet technicians will assist in the construction of three motor-road bridges in the eastern province of Ningrahar, near the Pakistani frontier. This activity would place Soviet personnel in sensitive tribal territory where disorders occurred last December in protest against government road-building operations. [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] (Map)

III. THE WEST

IV. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE ON
BERLIN SITUATION

OK
The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee pointed out that its conclusions are to be used in context with all SNIEs relevant to the Berlin situation.

22 July 59

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1

1. The USSR continues to maintain its hard position at Geneva by linking an all-German commission with a specified time limit to an agreement for an interim solution on Berlin, apparently in anticipation of gaining further Western concessions. Furthermore, Gromyko has refused to clarify the Soviet position on the duration of Western rights in relation to an interim Berlin agreement.

2. So long as the Soviet leaders estimate that the prospects for negotiation with the West over Berlin are favorable to them they will not conclude a separate peace treaty with the GDR or turn over access controls to the East Germans. The USSR will continue to use threats of such actions as a form of pressure on the West. The actual physical transfer of controls could be accomplished with little or no warning.

3. While there are no reliable indications of a bloc intent to deny Allied or West German access to West Berlin, or to seal off West Berlin in the immediate future, such actions could be taken with little or no warning.

4. There has been no significant change in West Berlin's favorable economic situation.

5. There have been no significant changes in Soviet capabilities to respond to possible Western actions in the event of turnover, harassment, or blockade.

6. There were no major intelligence indications of Western allied diplomatic intentions, apart from information obtained through official contacts with US representatives. 25X1

22 July 59

DAILY BRIEF

iii

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Afghan-Soviet Bridge Construction Agreement Announced

Afghanistan and the USSR on 18 July announced a new agreement under which Soviet technicians are to assist in the construction of three motor-road bridges in the eastern province of Ningrahar, near the Pakistani frontier. This activity would place Soviet personnel in the region opposite the Pakistani states of Chitral and Dir, which are subject to only limited and indirect control by Karachi, and near the sensitive Mohmand tribal area which lies astride the Afghan-Pakistani border.

The projected bridges apparently are part of an Afghan Government program for road development in this region. This program is probably partly intended to facilitate the development of mineral and forest resources in the province. The restive local tribes have opposed this construction because such road development facilitates the extension of central government control in their territory. An Afghan district official was murdered in this area last December by Mohmands, one of the Pushtu tribes, and Kabul sent troops which suppressed the agitation and arrested a number of Mohmand leaders. Afghan Prime Minister Daud [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] He may intend the new agreement as a show of confidence in his ability to control the local tribes.

[redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET